This essay demonstrates how a clever and mentally agile defendant, with the help of equally intelligent confederates, successfully propagated a fiction at his trial shortly after the end of the Second World War that has remained arcane and unchallenged for more than fifty years. Contemporaneous documents strongly suggest that Generalfeldmarschall Albert Konrad Kesselring 1 skillfully assumed culpability for an alleged war crime in which he had not actually been involved. It was a diversionary ploy. While he probably expected to be punished for this, he hoped his admission would eliminate the possibility that the Allied investigators might discover he had actually participated in another, unrelated crime, the penalty for which would likely be much more severe. The dissemblance he manufactured was accepted because it was plausible, verisimilar, and because he was considered an honorable man. It has been assimilated by subsequent generations as well, so that it is now enshrined as historical truth.
befehl, not its author. Nevertheless, in late 1946 Kesselring was informed that he, too, had been indicted as a war criminal, 6 Kesselring's trial began on 10 February 1947 before a British Military Commission in Venice. He faced two charges. The first, which alone will be discussed here, asserted that he had »committed a war crime« in passing to subordinate units a Führerbefehl which resulted in the shooting of 335 Italian nationals in the Ardeatine Caves in Rome on 24 March 1944/ On 6 May 1947 the Court found him guilty on both counts and sentenced him to be shot. On 3 July 1947 this sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life, but in 1952 he was released from custody because of impaired health. He died at Bad Nauheim on 15 July I960. 8 The two charges were: »CHARGE I[,] COMMITTING A WAR CRIME in that he AT ROME, ITALY on or about 23 March 1944, in violation of the laws and usages of war, was concerned in the killing as a reprisal of some 335 Italian Nationals in the Ardeatine Caves«; and »CHARGE II [,] COMMITTING A WAR CRIME, in that he [b] etween JUNE and AUGUST 1944, in violation of the laws and usages of war, when OBERBEFEHLS-HABER der HEERESGRUPPE SUEDWEST (Commander in Chief Army Group South West) [sic] , incited and commanded the German Armed Forces and German Police Forces in ITALY under his Command to kill Italian Civilians as reprisals in consequence of which a number of Italian Civilians were killed.« The charges are listed in a summary of the trial written by the two American observers included among the papers deposited with the transcript in the National Archives and is entitled »Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Report and Records of War Crimes Trial of Albert Kesselring, to the Commanding General Mediterranean Theater of Operations,« paragraph 3.
Throughout his trial Kesselring and his principal witnesses Generalmajor (later
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The New York Times, 5 Jul 47, p. 2, and ibid., 17 Jul 60, p. 60. 9 In the German terminology of the Second World War, O.B. Südwest could refer to both Kesselring, the Oberbefehlshaber, as well as his Kommandostelle. In order to avoid ambiguity, Monte Soratte, the location of his command post in March 1944, will be used in this essay whenever reference is made to the location and/or the command apparatus of the theater command situated there since September 1943. The Feldmarschall's Kommandostelle was established at Frascati, south of Rome, in early 1943 and remained there until it was bombed out on 8 Sep 43. Monte Soratte (Soracte) was an extensive above-and below-ground installation which extended westward from the small village of San Oreste on the southeastern slope of the 691-meters-high Monte Soratte on the right bank of the River Tiber. The latter separates the mountain from the Sabine Hills. The Oberbefehlshaber's Kommandostelle was located there until the Allies, advancing from the south in summer 1944, forced it to be moved northward.
Returning to Monte Soratte between 1900-2000 hours, 11 23 March he was informed at once by Westphal and Beelitz about the Via Rasella incident, and that Hitler was insisting on a harsh reprisal. At about 2000 hours, an officer in the Wehrmachtführungsstab im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht then at Berchtesgaden because Hitler was at the Berghof on the Obersalzberg above the town 12 telephoned Westphal to tell him Hitler had agreed that a ten-for-one execution ratio was to be inflicted on Italian hostages. Simultaneously, according to Kesselring, Kappler telephoned the Feldmarschall from Rome to say that he, Kappler, could find a sufficient number of victims in the Via Tasso and other Roman prisons who were »Todeskandida-ten« to satisfy this requirement. Kesselring, Westphal, and Beelitz all testified how this good news produced relief and »elation« among the three, because it meant that prisoners facing death sentences, and not innocent hostages as specified by Hitler, would be executed. Westphal, as instructed by Kesselring, then telephoned the Führerbefehl to AOK14 for relay to the appropriate, subordinate echelons. Westphal testified that Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Chef des Wehrmachtführungsstabes im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, telephoned him at 2300-2400 hours, 23 March to convey a second, expanded Führerbefehl: Hitler still insisted on the ten-for-one reprisal ratio but, in addition, demanded that Kappler's Sipo »carry out« the executions. Kesselring had already gone to bed, but Westphal said he awakened the Feldmarschall to advise him of this amended Führerbefehl, and he was told to pass Hitler's order along to AOK 14. Kesselring, Westphal, and Beelitz said that this further heightened their elation, because it freed the Wehrmacht of all responsibility for the reprisal. Early on 24 March, they said, Kesselring boarded his Fieseler-Storch and took off in it to revisit the Cassino Front. 13 For nearly fifty years this version has been accepted and recited by every journalist and historian, with a single exception to my knowledge, who has written about Kesselring in connection with the Via Rasella/Ardeatine Caves incident. It With the fighting raging at Cassino, what was he doing so far from Monte Soratte and the main battle arena? German reserves were spread thinly, and he had always been fearful that the Americans and British might try to land in force on the coast of Tuscany, that is, behind the 10th and 14th Armies, as they had farther south at Anzio/Nettuno in January 1944. In early March he had transferred the Fallschirmpanzerdivision »Hermann Göring« from the Anzio/Nettuno beachhead to Lucca, north of Pisa in Tuscany, to serve as a mobile reserve which could strike against an Allied invasion in this region. 23 28 What did these findings mean? Why, as it appears from these documents to be irrefutable, had he and his staff officers conspired to prevaricate in their affidavits and repeatedly in their testimony about his location on 23/24 March? Why had he not told the simple truth from the beginning: »I was in Liguria, not at Monte Soratte, when Hitler's reprisal order for Via Rasella arrived and knew nothing about it until I was informed after the event«? He appears to have established this fiction early in the postwar period and never strayed from it when interrogated. It was accepted by Colonel Scotland, his principal interrogator at the »Kensington Cage« in London, as well as by others who later interviewed Kesselring. 29 He knew that his stubborn adherence to it was likely to render him vulnerable to prosecution for involvement in the Ardeatine Caves killings. Why, then, did he persist in its propagation? The only explanation, it seemed to me, was that he must be hiding something which was more threatening than accountability for his röle in the Ardeatine Caves shootings.
A chance telephone conversation with William Wiley, a Canadian historian, produced the clue which pointed toward the most likely solution of this enigma. 30 Wiley had been working on records concerning German Army reprisals and mentioned to me that two American officers and thirteen enlisted men had landed on the western coast of Italy to demolish railroad-tunnel exits, had been captured on 24 March, and were shot on 26 March 1944. They were members of an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Operational Group (OG) which was code-named »Ginny Mission.« At once it was clear to me that they must be the American saboteurs described in two almost-forgotten entries in a Gen. Kdo 32 The Ginny Mission OG, captured near Bonassola at about 1000 hours on 24 March 1944, had been transported to La Spezia, twenty-two kilometers southeast of Bonassola, in mid-afternoon. Kesselring had already arrived in La Spezia at 1030 hours that morning. How could he not have been informed about this »special event«? Moreover, according to testimony given at Kesselring's trial, the Feldmarschall had reserved the right to confirm all death sentences, including those of every captured Allied commando, in his theater. 33 After the war it could not have escaped Kesselring's notice how little time elapsed before the enraged Americans exacted vengeance by bringing Dostler to trial and shooting him. 34 His own chances would be better, he must have reasoned, if he were to accept responsibility for passing on a Führerbefehl which resulted in the deaths of 335 Italians in Rome rather than reveal his presence in La Spezia on 24 March and thereby establish a link between himself and the murders of fifteen Americans.
The tragic story of the Ginny Mission must now briefly be told: This OG belonged to Unit »A,« First Contingent, 2677th Headquarters Company, OSS, Experimental, (Provisional), in August 1944 renamed Company »A,« 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Provisional). 35 Recruitment by the OSS of its officers and men from regular U.S. Army units began in April/May 1943. All were and remained U.S. Army personnel. All had already been trained as riflemen, engineers, radio operators, medical corpsmen, and the like. Their mission, unlike those of the U.S. Rangers, would be to land and operate behind enemy lines in Italy, where they would train, organize, and support native partisans and sabotage German installations. They received special irregular-warfare training in the United States before shipping overseas, and this was continued in Corsica after they had helped drive the Germans out of the island in October 1943. All were volunteers, understood the hazards their missions would involve, and presumably spoke Italian with more or less fluency. 36 They were not U.S. Rangers, although the two for- mations were alike in some ways: the chief difference was that Rangers operated in front of the enemy, while OG operations, like most OSS activities, typically focused on targets in the enemy's rear. 37 »The primary mission of the OGs was to organize, train, and equip resistance groups in order to convert them into guerrillas, and to serve as the nuclei of such groups in operations against the enemy as directed by the Theatre Commander.« 38 At dusk on 22 March 1944 the two officers and thirteen enlisted men of the Ginny Mission OG sailed in two PT boats of Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 15, U.S. Navy, from Bastia, on the eastern coast of Corsica, into the Gulf of Genoa. Their objective was Stazione di Framura on the coast of Liguria, 170 kilometers northeast of Bastia and 25 kilometers northwest of La Spezia. Their task was to demolish the exits of two railroad tunnels separated by 100 meters of open track 300 meters southwest of Stazione di Framura. This was part of the main western coastal rail line which, winding through mountainous Liguria, carried supplies from Genoa southward through La Spezia and Tuscany to Rome and then to the German 10. Armee, defending along the rivers Rapido, Gari, and Garigliano, and 14. Armee at Anzio/Nettuno. The tunnel exits selected for demolition were considered inaccessible to air strikes. The OG's orders were to find the target as quickly as possible, set their explosives, and then return immediately to the boats: it was to be quickly in, quickly out. 39 At 2300-2330 hours the OG made landfall in rubber boats which had been launched from one of the PT boats 300 meters west of the target. Shortly afterward the OG radioed that it was »on target«; then, however, further radio contact between it and the PT boats was lost when a German convoy approached, forcing the boats to take evasive actions. Ship-to-shore communications had still not been reestablished by 0300 hours, 23 March; with dawn approaching, the decision was made aboard the boats to return to Bastia. In accordance with a contingency plan, the PTs returned to offshore positions west of Framura the night of 23/24 March and again on 25/26 March. On neither occasion were radio or flashlight signals received from the OG ashore. The latter had been furnished with the address of a partisan safe house at Bobbio, on the River Trebbia 70 kilometers northeast of Bonassola. 40 In the event recovery by sea was not possible, they were instructed to make their way to this refuge, from which they might later be exfiltrated. Aerial re- connaissance showed that the tunnel exits had not been demolished. 41 On 27 March 1944 a Radio Vienna communique was intercepted which dashed the hopes of those waiting anxiously for news of the missing OG: »Along the Oriental coast of the Gulf of Genoa, an American unit composed of two officers and thirteen enlisted men landed northwest of La Spezia and was killed in combat.« 42 This was the standard format ordered by Hitler to be used in reporting the deaths of all captured commandos. 43 The OG had not been killed in combat. All fifteen had surrendered on 24 March and, although wearing full, regular U.S. Army uniforms, were shot without trial early on the morning of 26 March 1944. 44 These details were not known until after La Spezia had fallen to the U.S. 92nd Infantry Division on 24 April 1945. 45 Only then could investigators interrogate local Italian citizens, some of whom showed them the common burial site, from which the remains were disinterred a few weeks later. (Washington 1950) , pp. 73-80. The prescriptions laid down in these documents were clear and unequivocal: all saboteurs, whether or not they were in uniform, resisted capture, or surrendered even if they were unarmed were to be shot after interrogation. It would then be broadcast that they had been killed in action, as, indeed, was announced on 27 Mar 44 in the case of the Ginny Mission OG executions. If their captors were not Wehrmacht, e.g., Italian soldiers or civilians, they were to be turned over to the Sipo/SD for interrogation. Under no circumstances were they to be treated as prisoners of war. Strong measures were threatened for German officers who did not comply. In the supplementary instruction Hitler explained that the purpose of the Kommandobefehl was to eliminate prisoner-of-war status as a possibility for commandos and saboteurs who might carry out their mission and then surrender rather than fight when facing imminent capture. The mission of the captured Americans was sabotage; therefore, they fit this formula except that they had not blown up the tunnel exits. Technically, therefore, they had not committed the crime of sabotage. 44 That the Kommandobefehl was manifestly »unlawful« is another matter. Paragraph 3 of the »Ten Commandments,« pasted inside the front cover of every German soldier's pay book, stipulated unambiguously: »No enemy who has surrendered [underlined in original] will be killed including partisans and spies. the Americans, after landing, had not been able to locate the target. They had gone up into the hills behind the shoreline, where they found cover in an unoccupied stable 500 meters northwest of Bonassola. Early on 24 March their rubber boats and explosives were discovered by a peasant who reported his discovery to the Fascist-Republican militia in Bonassola. The Germans were alerted, and a mixed militia/ Wehrmacht patrol began combing through the area. By 1000-1030 hours, morning of 24 March, it had captured the fifteen Americans after a brief struggle. The prisoners were taken to Bonassola where they were interrogated by Italian officials and, early in the afternoon, transported by the Germans to La Spezia. Oberst Kurt Aimers, whose Festungsbrigade 135 was responsible for defense of the area around La Spezia, a former Italian naval base, had established his headquarters in a castle at Carozzo on a hillside one kilometer northeast of La Spezia. The Americans were confined there. 46 It is inconceivable that Kesselring, who must have stopped at the castle when he was in La Spezia that same afternoon, knew nothing about them. The prisoners were intensively interrogated, and a tactical report was sent to General Dostler's headquarters near San Andrea as soon as it was learned that no Allied invasion in Liguria or Tuscany was imminent. Next morning, 25 March, Oberst Almers received an order from Dostler's headquarters to proceed with the execution of the Americans pursuant to the Kommandobefehl. 47 Some German officers did not believe the Americans should be classified as saboteurs and qualify for execution, rather that they should be treated as prisoners of war. One of these was Hauptmann d.R. Alexander Fürst zu Dohna-Schlobitten, serving in March 1944 as the Ic at Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K., and it is his report to Armeegruppe von Zangen that is quoted above. 48 When he learned that the Americans had been in uniform, he advised Aimers that they should be sent to a prisoner-ofwar stockade. Although early on 25 March Dostler had ordered the executions, in the afternoon Aimers received an instruction that these be temporarily postponed. Later, in Dostler's absence, Oberst i.G. Horst Kraehe, Chef des Generalstabes at Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K., detailed Dohna-Schlobitten to transmit Dostler's execution order to Aimers. Dohna-Schlobitten was incensed (empört): unable to convince Kraehe that he was certain the Americans were not candidates for execution, that shooting them would constitute a contravention of the Geneva Convention, and that the same penalty would henceforth likely be applied to German saboteurs and commandos caught by the Allies, he refused to obey his superior officer. A few weeks later Dohna-Schlobitten was informed by Kraehe that he would be dismissed from the Corps because he had protested the order. Dostler wrote in his personal file that he was »politi-cally unreliable,« and in May 1944 he was discharged from the Army and assigned to dig antitank ditches at Lyck in East Prussia. Even though Dostler's headquarters had delayed the executions during the afternoon while the matter was discussed with »higher authority,« 56 Aimers ordered one of the officers belonging to Festungsbataillon 905 of his brigade to select an execution site on Punta Bianca and prepare a grave. That evening Dostler insisted that Aimers carry out the executions next morning. Early on 26 March the Americans were divided into two groups and trucked to the tip of Punta Bianca where they were shot by German soldiers of Festungsbataillon 906. Their bodies were buried in a common grave near Ferrara (Liguria), approximately one kilometer southeast of Ameglia. 57 As described supra, Kesselring had inspected gun positions from Monte Soratte and not available to his staff at this time. However, it should be noted that Westphal testified it was Generaloberst von Mackensen, Oberbefehlshaber der 14. Armee, to whom he would have turned if a command decision -albeit admittedly referring to Via Rasella -were required when Kesselring . Unfortunately, it is the unhappy experience of every researcher who examines RG 242 to discover sooner or later that many of the files or their parts are missing. For various reasons some never reached the Heeresarchiv in Potsdam from the field commands; others were found and carted off eastward by the Red Army; still others were destroyed by their German custodians at the time of the German collapse. In the case at hand no document beyond the initial brief reports of the capture and summary execution of the Ginny Mission OG could be found, and a suspicion gradually developed that more than chance alone must explain so complete an absence of a paper trail. This was confirmed by evidence which emerged in the transcript of Dostler's trial. Several German officers testified that in early April 1944 units associated with the executions had received telegrams from Monte Soratte ordering that all records of the affair were to be destroyed, and compliance with this order reported. 67 This system was reserved chiefly for communication at the highest level, as between army groups and OKW or ΟΚΗ. 6β The »Fish« link between Monte Soratte and the terminal at Strausberg, east of Berlin, which then relayed this traffic eastward to »Anna« and the Führerhauptquärtier, was code-named »Bream« by Bletchley Park. 69 It is possible Kesselring used »Tunny«/«Bream« to report the capture and execution of the Americans in terms which would have revealed the extent of his involvement to the Führerhauptquartier in this period.
With that said, my serious charge that the Feldmarschall dissembled at his trial is supported solely by the records, cited supra, which document that he had been in northern Italy from 22 to 25 March 1944. Fortunately for the historian, these records seem not to have been included in his expurgation order. The evidence in the telephone log brands Westphal as a dissimulator: he knew he had not told the truth. Dietrich Beelitz, likewise, testified falsely that the Feldmarschall was visiting the Cassino Front on 23 and 24 March, albeit only circumstantial documentary evidence exists to prove that he actually knew otherwise.
Siegfried Westphal died in 1983: of the three highest-ranking officers at Monte Soratte in March 1944 only Beelitz is alive today. During the course of two interviews in May 1997 he was shown the records of Kesselring's tours of inspection in Liguria on 23 and 24 March 1944 and at Ravenna on 25 March, as well as copies of the AOK10 telephone logs which had surfaced at the National Archives. After overcoming initial surprise, he pronounced them genuine 70 He then claimed that the itineraries were actually only schedules; however, after examining these documents more closely he recognized them as Berichte of the events as actually experienced. Now agreeing that Kesselring had, indeed, not been at the Cassino-Garigliano Front on 23 March as he and the others had repeatedly testified, he proposed that the Feldmarschall must have flown from northern Italy to Monte Soratte in the evening of 23 March, stayed the night of 23/24 March at his Kommandostelle, and then flew back to Liguria. 71 If that had been the case, one supposes it would have been recorded in a log which his pilot was obliged to keep, and that this document should be filed in the Bundesarchiv-Militararchw: however no pilots' logs are deposited there. 72 As has been documented supra, Kesselring Ibid. hours, 23 March 1944 after a flight from the Cassino-Garigliano Front. 73 This was important for them to establish, because it fixed in time two telephone calls to Monte Soratte which were essential features of the defense strategy at Kesselring's trial. According to the transcript, a vehicle fetched the Feldmarschall from the Fieseler-Storch landing field at Stazione di San Oreste, in the valley three kilometers (as the crow flies) southwest of the headquarters installations on Monte Soratte. Westphal and his former la testified that they met him as he descended from the vehicle in front of his office building and briefed him quickly about the events at Via Rasella. 74 »A short time after the return of the Field Marshal there was a call [to him] from Kappler,« his former la testified. 75 Kappler, in a conversation which lasted only a few minutes, offered to furnish a sufficient number of Italians who were »To-deskandidaten« (or »todeswürdig«) from Roman prisons to satisfy Hitler's reprisal demands. 76 At about the same time Westphal had been summoned to the telephone in his own office: Generalmajor Horst Frhr. Treusch von Buttlar-Brandenfels, Chef der Operationsabteilung im Wehrmachtführungsstab, was telephoning from Berchtesgaden to inform Monte Soratte that Hitler had accepted the 10-for-l reprisal formula. 77 In the midst of Westphal's telephone conversation, Kesselring came into the room. After Westphal had rung off, he told Kesselring about the call from Buttlar, whereupon the Feldmarschall informed his Generalstabschef of the discussion he had just had with Kappler. 78 Kesselring's former la swore he had been an eyewitness to these events. Moreover, he added, he knew the contents of the telephone calls in each case because he had monitored parts, at least, of both through separate earphones, a duty expected of him. 79 82 When the Oberbefehlshaber was absent from his Kommandostelle, his Chef des Generalstabes was the senior officer and deputized for him. In that capacity it would have been mandatory for Westphal to know the location of Kesselring: he did, as is confirmed in the telephone log. During most of the afternoon of 23 March 1944 Westphal was inspecting »Reece Unit 400,« a newly created rapid-deployment battalion, near Civita Castellana about thirty-five kilometers southwest of Monte Soratte. 83 Until Westphal returned when summoned because of the events in the Via Rasella, Kesselring's la was the senior officer at Monte Soratte. With both Kesselring and Westphal absent, it is reasonable to assume that Beelitz would also have been aware of the Feldmarschall's true location in northern Italy.
If the principals did not have opportunities to meet before Kesselring's trial began, it is difficult to imagine how they might have participated in a conspiracy to prevaricate. But in addition to other occasions when they could have seen each other in Allied P.O. W. enclosures, all participated in the postwar project sponsored by the Chief Historian of the European Theater, U.S. Army, the purpose of which was to produce manuscripts describing military operations as seen from the »other side of the hill.« Meetings among them probably occurred much less casually than Westphal tried to make it appear in the following excerpts from the Kesselring transcript.
Col Westphal: I was meant to describe the history of the campaign in the West.
have come together I do not wish that to be any disadvantage to the defense or to the witnesses. That is all I wanted to point out. 85 In several instances the testimony of one of Kesselring's defense witnesses suspiciously contradicted that of the other. For example, we have seen how Kesselring swore that, shortly after his return at dusk on 23 March 1944 to Monte Soratte from the Cassino Front, he received a telephone call from Kappler offering to furnish for the reprisal executions only those in his prisons who had been sentenced to death. 86 But Kappler repeatedly denied he had spoken with the Feldmarschall that day. 87 Kesselring also found himself and Westphal pulling at opposite ends of the rope on another issue. Kesselring 
March, which had conveyed to Monte Soratte Hitler's approval of a reprisal ratio of ten Italians to be executed for every dead policeman. Now, Jodl informed Westphal, the Führer had decided to assign full responsibility for the reprisal action to Kappler's Außenkommando Rom. The Feldmarschall, Westphal testified, had planned to fly back to the Cassino Front before dawn on 24 March and had already gone to bed when this call came. When the Generalstabschef awakened him to report the news, both rejoiced. With his Feldmarschall's happy approval, Westphal said, he passed Hitler's second order to AOK14 for transmission to the Kommandant von Rom and thence to Kappler. Not once in the witness box did Westphal budge from this position. Kesselring, on the other hand, asserted as steadfastly that he could not remember having received this information from Westphal, either during the night or when the latter saw him at the nearby Fieseler-Storch landing field before takeoff in the morning. He asserted that he did not learn of the second Führerbefehl .until he had returned to Monte Soratte in the evening of 24 March, or perhaps even on the following day. 88 Here, presumably, the two conspirators had failed to correlate invented recollections.
Another who, probably inadvertently, helped perpetuate the perjury was former SS-Standartenführer Eugen Dollmann, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler's eyes and ears in Rome. In his memoirs Dollmann claimed he and Wolff conferred with Kesselring at Monte Soratte late on the afternoon of 24 March. 89 Since Kesselring was in the area of Livorno until after 1620 hours on 24 March, it is not pos- sible such a meeting could have taken place. Possibly Dollmann has merely mistaken the date; however, since he seems to have been the type who »hears the grass grow,« he might have had another motive which remains obscure. At any rate it is not likely he was privy to the alleged conspiracy.
Dr. Hans Laternser, Kesselring's very able counsel, nearly blundered into a very dangerous mine field when he asked Westphal about enforcement of Hitler's Kommandobefehl in Italy:
Laternser: It was put to you that it was very difficult to understand that through the agreement of the Wehrmacht with Kappler the carrying out of a Hitler order [that Italian hostages must be executed] was canceled, and you mentioned in this connection the so-called commando order and you said this commando order had not been carried out either. Westphal: Yes. Laternser: What were the contents of this so-called commando order.
Westphal: The gist of it shortly was the following: All enemy soldiers who were caught behind our own lines independent, whether they came by sea or were dropped by air, will be killed. Westphal: I myself saw this order for the first time in Africa; at that time in Africa it was burned at once so that nobody could even get it into his head to pass such an order on, and in Italy I never saw it but it was not carried out; it was never carried out that is in Italy with the exception of one case, General Dossier [sic] . In all the other cases we did not [report them] to higher authority as so-called commando troops but treated them as simple normal P.O.W.s; and an additional remark with regard to General Dossler's case; this was not known in time [at] Army Group Headquarters. Laternser: What was the attitude of General Field Marshal Kesselring with regard to this commando order? Westphal: He objected to this order and his objection was really the only fact why this commando order was not being obeyed in Italy. Judge advocate: Is he saying that the Field Marshal did not publish this order to his troops or is he, saying it was published but they did not act on it? Westphal: It is not clear. Laternser: Do you know whether this order was passed on or whether he saw to it that it was not published or whether an additional order was published to this original order which in reality canceled the sense of the Hitler order, or what do you know about it? Westphal: During my time this order was never published. It was never passed on, but I must say that I came to Italy later than this order had been received, but the Field Marshal reserved for himself the right to decide upon the fate of every member of a commando and he decided always in all cases that they should be treated as normal RO.W.s and had he known about the case of General Dossier his decision would have been exactly the same as in other cases. 90 It is hardly likely that Kesselring was in La Spezia on 24 March and did not know about the captured Ginny Mission »commandos.« It is equally unlikely that Dostler would have ordered their executions without first receiving confirmation from Kesselring. 91 The operation of Hitler and Mussolini there was always a very obliging attitude, therefore, these orders made by OKW could not easily be applied to the Italian theater of war. 100 Once again Jackson apparently overlooked Kesselring's obfuscations and equivocations which, admittedly, are so readily apparent in retrospect. Perhaps he had concluded it was not possible to elicit straight answers from the witness, threw up his hands in frustration, and moved on to other subjects. The provisions of the Kommandobefehl of 18 October 1942 are as clear and definitive today as they must have been to German generals in March 1944. Is it possible to imagine that Hitler would have tolerated interpretation by field commanders of this or any Führerbefehl which deviated from his own? Kesselring himself answered this question: »I have understood from your testimony this morning that you felt perfectly free to disagree with Hitler and to make suggestions to him and give him information, »Jackson had asked earlier,« but that, after his mind was made up and an order issued, it had to be obeyed. That is to say ...« »Yes,« Kesselring shot back. 101 It was one instance in which he spoke the unvarnished truth. Significantly, there is not one word of testimony at his own trial in spring 1947 about his usurpation of the authority to interpret application of the Kommandobefehl in the Italian theater. 104 These documents categorically establish that the capture of the Ginny Mission OG must have been known at Monte Soratte by midnight, 24/25 March, or shortly thereafter, at least thirty hours before the executions took place and in sufficient time to stop them had that ever really been an intention. And despite Westphal's denials, the Kommandobefehl had, indeed, been distributed to the subordinate formations in Heeresgruppe C. Former General von Senger und Etterlin had come to Heeresgruppe C even later than Westphal but said he knew about it. 105 Dostler testified he had known of its provisions since the time of issuance in autumn 1942. 106 Leutnant zur See Georg Sessler, the naval officer who interrogated the captured Ginny Mission OG, swore he had seen a copy. 107 Dr. Laternser firmly believed in his client's veracity, as the following excerpt from his closing address to the court demonstrates:
Anyone who has seen the Field Marshal during the two weeks of his being questioned will have gained the conviction that this man has never attempted to speak an untruth. His sometimes rather complicated answers could always be traced back to the obvious desire to discover the truth himself, to serve the truth, and to let truth be victorious even if it were at his own expense. Can any man who has seen the Field Marshal as a soldier believe that he has not the courage to stand by the truth? One who has carried out fairly the battle against the enemy in most difficult times will not disparage his own value and will not attempt to ward off this most difficult battle of his life by a lack of truth. This is my conviction, that full credence must be given to the evidence of these officers who have appeared as witnesses as well as to the sworn statement of the Field Marshal himself. 108 There is no evidence to suggest the thought ever occurred to Dr. Latemser that the scenario his client had crafted was anything short of the truth. It must be presumed he had been duped. Like most Germans, Hans Laternser doubtless accepted as an article of faith that the honorable qualities of character he perceived in Kesselring were those which prevailed among German Feldmarschälle, indeed generally throughout the German officer corps.
On at least two occasions while on the witness stand Kesselring bristled when the prosecutor made it quite clear he thought the Feldmarschall was lying. »May I say the following on that subject,« Kesselring said with apparent wounded pride to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, while testifying at Nürnberg as a witness for Hermann Goring, »if my statements as Field Marshal and witness under oath are considered as little as you are considering them, Mr. Prosecutor, then further statements of mine do not serve any purpose.« 109 After reacting similarly to intensive questioning by the prosecutor at his own trial, Kesselring quickly regained his composure and addressed the court as follows: »May I say a few words to the court? I would like to apologize to the court for my temperament and for my temper which apparently arose a little bit, but I am at the moment in the claws of the beginning 'flu and therefore I think the court will understand, and apart from my state of health which today is not perfect I was excited because I was accused of having told a lie.« 110 It is clear today that these apparent manifestations of Kesselring's indignation were nothing short of hypocrisy. »Nothing can hurt a man who is acquitted by his own conscience,« he wrote in his memoirs, baldly continuing to defend his veracity. »This is, besides, an attitude which stood me in good stead at my trial.« 111 »A German officer moves within the framework of international law,« Kesselring said. 112 That is essentially how generals in the enemy's camp viewed him. To most he had been an outstanding military defensive strategist and worthy opponent, as well as a man of honor, of decency. In their view it had been the fighting then raging in the town of Cassino, not the assassinations in the Via Rasella, upon which his attention was riveted on 23 March 1944: when Hitler's reprisal order arrived he had merely nodded his head in assent that it should be passed to the responsible subordinate formations and then turned back to concentrate on his enormous military problems at Cassino. That had been the extent of his »war crime.« Most have agreed that, despite a somewhat tarnished shield because of his insistence on a vigorous anti-partisan policy in Italy, he had been unfairly judged and convicted, and that his death sentence was not deserved. 113 Two American colonels assigned by the U.S. Adjutant General's Office as observers at his trial went on record to say they had not been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution had proved either of its two charges against Kesselring. 114 Obviously disagreeing with the prosecution's position that the execution of innocent civilians during a reprisal is always unlawful, one of them (Colonel James Notestein) voluntarily approached Dr. Laternser and donated to the defense his personal copy of the U.S. Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, 1940 edition. Its paragraphs 358 and 359, declaring that reprisals are sanctioned under certain conditions, were entered as evidence. 115 The American observers, like Dr. Laternser and all others in the courtroom except the former Feldmarschall and his principal witnesses, could not know they had been victimized.
Study of the transcript, alone, reinforces an impression that British justice did not serve Kesselring fairly in spring 1947; indeed, it is not hard to conclude that he might have fallen prey to a festering British thirst for victors' justice. Had he been too successful a battle-field opponent in Italy? Be that as it may, the documents newly unearthed in Record Group 242 seem to reveal a dark, unattractive component of his character which has long remained hidden from those who admire him. 116 Perhaps his secret would have remained undetected for another fifty years had he and Westphal been more discrete in their telephone conversations with officers 117 It would appear that this was an object lesson which Kesselring grasped immediately: he surely noticed how swiftly American wrath over the killing of the Ginny OG had doomed Dostler. Most likely he decided early on that it would be in his best interests to risk the consequences of assuming responsibility merely for passing on Hitler's order to execute 335 Italians. That was the essence of his defense, and it is doubtful he believed the British would sentence him to death for it. 118 But Kappler's executioners had shot 335 before the horror ended. 119 »Whatever you may say about international law and reprisals, clearly five men of these 335 were murdered,« the judge advocate said in his summing up of the evidence at Kesselring's trial. »There is no other way out: that was a war crime, and you cannot get away from it. There was no Fuhrer [sic] order to cover that; it was quite outside the reprisal.« 120 Not realizing how close he had come to the ultimate truth, the prosecutor had said to Kesselring at one point in the trial: »Let me make it quite clear. If one of your officers had passed on [the Führerbefehl] to 14th Army in your absence at the front and without your knowledge you would never be in the dock today on a charge of being concerned in the killing of those 335 Italians.« 121 That might have been an opportune moment for Kesselring to admit the truth, but he continued to stay the Westphal: It has certainly been reported in the daily report of the Army Group von Zangen to us. Haythorne: Do you remember anything about it? Does it sound familiar to you now? Westphal: I think, yes. I already mentioned something about some troops in La Spezia, in Freising, without knowing anything more about it. I think that my testimony, that I have in Freising, must show this, because I said that we had tried to avoid the execution of these troops, at first in Ancona [a case involving the capture of British commandos], and then perhaps later on in La Spezia, too. I would say that I have a vague recollection of it. I must add that at that time I worked for 17 hours a day, and I, at that time, just went to the hospital, too. Later on, I still suffered from heavy blood poisoning, and I have to state that I know very little of what went on in this half a year. Perhaps I may put it this way: I remember that commando troops landed near La Spezia, and I think it is probable that such reports had been referred to the OKW. 123 Here we have another example of circumlocution by Westphal in a determined effort to hide the facts. As shown supra, Beelitz and later Zolling reported the capture of the Americans to the OKH more than twenty-four hours before they were executed. 124 It could scarcely have been possible that they knew this but Westphal did not. Commander, testified that his command was extremely large and that he was gone most of the time or a great deal of the time from his headquarters; that he has no independent recollection of this incident; that his chief of staff [Nagel] in his absence was authorized to do two things: Make decisions on normal procedural matters, or, second, if it was a matter of importance not to wait until the general got back but to send it up to the next higher headquarters. Now, since the general didn't hear anything about it must have been sent up to the next higher headquarters, and that is further born out by the fact that the Supreme Command of the Southwest had already been notified of it, and further by the telegram that came down on Sunday [ordering cancellation of the executions, i.e., after they had already taken place]. That establishes that the Supreme Command of the Southwest did know of it. General Dostler said that his chief of staff later advised him that he had received a reply [to the request for confirmation from higher authority]. There is no witness here that says who the reply came from and neither did the chief of staff say. The normal channel of communication would have been from the Supreme Command of the Southwest down to the [Armeegruppe] and down to General Dostler. In any event, the decision was the men will be executed and it was so ordered. 
